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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-1180 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DWAYNE TUCKER, 
 
                                          Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(Crim. No. 12-103) 
District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 7, 2013 
 
Before: FUENTES, GREENBERG, and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  November 7, 2013) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
Appellant Dwayne Tucker pleaded guilty to two offenses based upon his 
production and possession of child pornography.  Tucker now appeals the district court’s 
sentencing.  Tucker’s counsel also moves to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 
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386 U.S. 738 (1967).  For the reasons stated below, we affirm Tucker’s sentence, and 
grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. 
I. 
We set forth only the factual background and procedural history necessary to our 
analysis.
1
  On July 27, 2012, pursuant to a written Plea Agreement, Tucker pleaded guilty 
to one count of producing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (“Count 
One”), and one count of possessing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2252A(a)(5)(B) (“Count Two”).  Tucker accepted the representations of the Government 
that the exploitation detailed in Count One was produced or transmitted in interstate 
commerce and that the pornography he possessed depicted actual children. 
The District Court held a  sentencing hearing on January 4, 2013.  Consistent with 
the Plea Agreement, the court calculated Tucker’s offense level as 42, his criminal 
history Category as IV, and the advisory Guidelines range as 360 months to life.  Tucker 
argued at sentencing that the court should vary from the Guidelines range because of the 
circumstances of his upbringing.  The district court denied this request.  However, the 
district court did grant the Government’s downward departure motion pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, based upon Tucker’s cooperation and substantial assistance.  The 
Court imposed a sentence of 264 months imprisonment on Count One and 120 months if 
imprisonment on Count Two, to run concurrently.  The district court entered judgment on 
January 8, 2013.  Tucker filed a letter with this Court on January 16, 2013, which we 
                                              
1
 The district court had jurisdiction over this case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
over this appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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treat as a timely pro se Notice of Appeal.  Tucker’s letter indicates that his appeal is 
“based upon Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.”   
II. 
 Pursuant to Anders v. California, defense counsel may seek to withdraw from 
representing an indigent criminal defendant on appeal if, “after a conscientious 
examination of” the case, counsel “finds [an appeal] to be wholly frivolous.”   386 U.S. at 
744; see also United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 779 (3d Cir. 2000).  Defense 
counsel’s request to withdraw must be accompanied by “a brief referring to anything in 
the record that might arguably support the appeal.”  Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.  When 
assessing an Anders motion to withdraw, we ask (1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled 
the  requirements of Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a) by thoroughly searching 
the record for arguably appealable issues and explaining why those issues are frivolous; 
and (2) whether an independent review of the record reveals any nonfrivolous issues.  
United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3rd Cir. 2001).  If “the Anders brief initially 
appears adequate on its face,” the second step of our inquiry is “guided . . . by the Anders 
brief itself.”  Id. at 301 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 Defense counsel complied with Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a).  
Counsel’s Anders brief identifies four potential issues for appeal: (1) the district court’s 
jurisdiction over this action; (2) the validity of Tucker’s plea; (3) the reasonableness and 
legality of Tucker’s sentence; and (4) the ineffective assistance of counsel.  The Anders 
brief then explains why there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal.   
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 Based on our independent review, we reach the same conclusion.  First, the district 
court’s jurisdiction properly arose under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  Any challenge to the district 
court’s jurisdiction would therefore be frivolous.   
 Second, the district court properly conducted the plea hearing.  During that 
hearing, the District Court: advised and questioned Tucker pursuant to Rule 11(b)(1) of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; determined that there was sufficient factual 
basis for Tucker’s guilty plea; and ensured that the plea was knowing and voluntary and 
that there were no questions as to Tucker’s comprehension or competence.  Tucker’s plea 
was therefore indisputably valid. 
 Third, we agree that any appeal of Tucker’s sentence would be frivolous.  The 
District Court fully complied with Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 
imposing its sentence.  The sentence was also substantively and procedurally reasonable.  
See United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 203 (3d Cir. 2007) (“We review a sentence 
for reasonableness, evaluating both its procedural and substantive underpinnings.”).   The 
district court followed this Court’s three-step sentencing process by (1) calculating the 
applicable Guidelines range; (2) ruling on all departure motions; and (3) exercising the 
court’s discretion by considering all relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.  United States 
v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006).  The District Court then imposed a 
substantively reasonable sentence well below the Guidelines range.  See United States v. 
Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (explaining that a procedurally sound 
sentence will be affirmed “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the 
same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided”); 
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see also Lessner, 498 F.3d at 204 (“A sentence that falls within the recommended 
Guidelines range, while not presumptively reasonable, is less likely to be unreasonable 
than a sentence outside the range.”).  Any appeal of the District Court’s sentence would 
be frivolous for an additional reason: Pursuant to the Plea Agreement, Tucker agreed not 
to appeal his sentence if it “f[ell] within or below the Guidelines range that result[ed] 
from the agreed total Guidelines offense level of 42.”  Because Tucker’s sentence of 264 
months is well below the relevant Guidelines range, Tucker’s Plea Agreement bars him 
from challenging the sentence.  See United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 
2001) (“While it may appear unjust to allow criminal defendants to bargain away 
meritorious appeals, such is the necessary consequence of a system in which the right to 
appeal may be freely traded.” (quoting United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1169 
(11th Cir. 1999)). 
 Finally, Tucker’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is not ripe.  Where, as 
here, there are no facts in the record upon which an ineffective assistance claim can be 
evaluated,  this Court “defer[s] the issue of ineffectiveness of trial counsel to a collateral 
attack.”  United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 215 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  Thus, any such claim must be raised in an appropriate habeas petition 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
III. 
 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the District Court’s judgment of sentence, 
without prejudice to Tucker filing a separate proceeding raising a claim that counsel was 
ineffective, and grant counsel’s Anders motion. 
